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Abstract 
 
Drawing from prior research on disease contagion, we estimate a transmission matrix 
to quantify the communication rate across investors, as well as how it varies with 
distances in social characteristics (such as age, income, and gender). In particular, 
exploiting cross-industry stock-financed mergers and acquisitions as a source of 
plausibly exogenous shocks to some investors’ portfolio composition and 
consequently, their information gathering activity, we trace out the path of 
“contagion” from these directly impacted investors (“patient zero”) to their 
neighbors. Further, we link the speed of communication to various social 
characteristics; quantitatively, our estimates imply that a ten-year difference in age, 
a one-step difference in income, and having a different gender lower the 
communication rate by 12%, 14%, and 32%, respectively. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The question of how information, or noise, is transmitted in the marketplace is at the 
heart of asset pricing and economics in general. One important channel through 
which information or noise travels is via word-of-mouth communication. For instance, 
Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) note that “economic agents must often make decisions 
without knowing the costs and benefits of the possible choices” and thus “rely on 
whatever information they have obtained via casual word-of-mouth communication.” 
Shiller (2000) argues that word-of-mouth transmission of ideas can be an important 
source of short-term fluctuations in the stock market.  
In an effort to examine the effect of word-of-mouth communication on 
economic agents’ behavior, a number of recent studies document a positive 
correlation in stock trading activity across investors that are likely to be in direct 
contact with one another. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005), for instance, find that 
mutual fund managers increase their stock purchases (sales) when other managers 
from different fund families in the same city increase their purchases (sales) of the 
same stock.1 
While these prior findings are consistent with the notion that word-of-mouth 
communication can affect investor behavior, they are silent on an important aspect 
of social interaction: the speed at which information or noise travels in the 
population and becomes reflected in economic agents’ behavior. To illustrate, let’s 
draw an analogy with studies of disease transmission — think of the person with the 
information (or noise) as the infected, and those who do not possess the knowledge 
as the susceptible. In epidemiology, it is useful to know if a disease is infectious; it is 
                                                            
1 Relatedly, Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2007) find that when retail investors purchase (sell) a stock 
from a certain industry, other retail investors in the neighborhood increase their purchases (sales) of 
stocks in the same industry. 
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perhaps even more important to know the speed of contagion in the population, 
along with the determinants, so as to stop the epidemic. 
This exact logic carries over to the setting of financial markets. From a 
policy/practical perspective, knowing the rate of communication and its 
determinants can help design strategies to most efficiently disseminate information 
(e.g., about the availability of small business loans or government sponsored health 
care programs) to its target audience; or in some situations, to prevent the 
dissemination of information among the unintended audience. From a theoretical 
perspective, knowing the rate of communication and the determinants can help 
calibrate models that study the effect of communication among economic agents on 
aggregate economic outcomes (e.g., prices, growth, and investment). 
Empirically, to estimate the rate at which economic agents communicate with 
one another, we need to identify the source of the information or noise, so as to map 
out the path of “contagion.” This is similar to identifying “patient zero” in studies of 
disease transmission. The ideal experiment would be to randomly assign an investor 
(a.k.a., “patient zero”) to start collecting information on some stock S. The rate at 
which other investors in the nearer vs. further away neighborhoods start trading 
stock S, or related firms, would then inform the researcher about the speed of 
communication among investors. 
Motivated by this hypothetical, ideal setting, we exploit cross-industry stock-
financed mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as a source of plausibly exogenous 
variation in some investors’ portfolio composition and their subsequent information 
collection activity. In particular, we exploit the fact that, at the completion of a 
stock-backed cross-industry M&A, investors of the target firm from industry X 
receive shares of the acquiring firm from industry Y. We conjecture that once 
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“endowed” with shares of the acquiring firm, “target investors” then have a stronger 
incentive to gather information about the acquirer industry — at the minimum, target 
investors would now have to think carefully about when to sell their holdings in the 
acquirer firm. This elevated level of attention/information gathering in the acquirer 
firm can then lead to an increase in target investors’ trading activity in the acquirer 
industry. More important for our purpose, if target investors also communicate their 
views and opinions to other investors in the same neighborhood (“target neighbors”) 
via word-of-mouth, then shocks to target investors’ portfolios can further lead to an 
increase in target neighbors’ trading activity in the acquirer industry. Thus, by 
tracing out the path of “contagion” across target neighbors, we can then quantify the 
speed of communication among investors. 
To implement our empirical tests, we collect data on all cross-industry M&A 
deals for the period 1991 to 1996, which are then matched to detailed trading records 
of 78,000 US households from a discount brokerage.2 We categorize cross-industry 
M&A transactions into stock-financed and cash-financed ones: the former are at least 
partially financed through equity, while the latter are 100% financed by cash. After 
each stock-financed M&A, we track the trading behavior of target investors in the 
acquirer industry, excluding the acquirer firm itself to eliminate any mechanical 
effect. We repeat this exercise for neighbors of target investors, whereby a neighbor 
is defined as a non-target investor who lives within three miles of any target investor.  
We perform our tests in two steps. First, in a simple static setting, we verify 
that target investors indeed are affected by exogenous shocks to their portfolio 
composition, and further communicate their views and opinions to their neighbors. 
More specifically, we compare target investors’ and target neighbors’ trading activity 
                                                            
2 We discuss in detail in Section 2 the various advantages and disadvantages of focusing on this 
particular sample of investors in our analysis. 
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in the acquirer industry in the year prior vs. subsequent to the M&A, relative to 
other investors in our sample. 
The data support the notion that social interactions affect investors’ trading 
decisions. In the year after the completion of a stock-financed cross-industry M&A, 
relative to other investors, target investors more than double their trading frequency 
in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm itself). More importantly, 
neighbors of target investors also increase their trading frequency in the acquirer 
industry by over 11% in the same period. Consistent with social interaction playing 
an important role, the neighbor effect becomes statistically and economically 
insignificant as we expand the geographical distance (e.g., for neighbors that reside 
more than 7 miles away from a target investor) and also when we extend our 
analysis to the second or third year after M&A completion.  
In a series of placebo tests to help rule out alternative interpretations, we 
show that our documented effect completely disappears if we instead a) examine 
investors’ trading behavior around cash-financed M&As (where target investors 
receive cash as opposed to shares in the acquirer firm), or b) examine investors of the 
pseudo target firm — i.e., the firm that is in the same industry as the target firm with 
the closest size and book-to-market ratio. 
Our second and main set of tests draws from prior research on disease 
transmission. The fundamental idea is to estimate an N by N transmission matrix B 
from one period to the next (assuming N households in the system). To examine the 
effect of communication over P periods, we simply raise the matrix B to the power of 
P. The (i,j)th element in this matrix then captures the impact of household j’s 
behavior on household i over one period, and vice versa for the (j,i)th element. It is 
worth noting that, just as in epidemiology, the matrix B reflects the joint effect of 
5 
communication among investors (the contact rate), as well as the probability that an 
investor would act upon the advice from his neighbor (the transmission risk given 
contact). Without differentiating between the two components, we focus our analysis 
on the (effective) communication rate. 
To estimate this transmission matrix, after each M&A event, we trace the 
monthly trading activity of each household (living within a certain distance from any 
target investor) in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquiring firm itself) over the 
next 12 months — i.e., a maximum P of 12. (Our results are similar if we instead use 
trading data from the next 6, 9, 15, or 18 months). We then instrument the initial 
shock to investors’ portfolio composition and incentives to gather information by the 
target dummy — which equals one if the investor was holding target firm shares prior 
to the M&A announcement, and zero otherwise. Following this procedure, we end up 
with a set of 12 event-time equations, which need to be estimated jointly. 
For simplicity, we impose a linear structure on the elements of the 
transmission matrix. That is, we explicitly assume that Bi,j is a linear function of the 
physical and social distances between households i and j. The intercept in this linear 
specification reflects the base rate of communication (that is, with all distances equal 
to zero), and the residual term captures the unobserved determinants of 
communication rates.  
In our baseline specification, we include three social characteristics in this 
linear equation: income, age, and gender, all of which are likely to impact the 
effective communication rate between two investors. Quantitatively, our estimates 
imply that a ten-year difference in age, a one-step difference in income (as defined by 
the brokerage firm that supplied the data), and having a different gender lower the 
communication rate by 12%, 14%, and 32%, respectively. 
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In additional tests, we also include state dummies in the equation of Bi,j to 
estimate the residual state-fixed effects after controlling for observable social 
characteristics. We then correlate these state-fixed effects with existing proxies for 
sociability at the state level compiled by Putnam (2000). Corroborating our findings, 
there is generally a positive correlation between our estimated state-level 
communication rate (that is extracted from investors’ trading behavior) and the 
various components of the sociability index compiled from survey data. For example, 
the correlation between our measure of the state-average communication speed and a 
key variable in Putnum’s (2000) survey — whether one takes advice from a friend — is 
over 50%. 
In our final test, we examine whether investors, through casual conversation, 
transmit value-relevant information that has not been factored into prices or simply 
spread noise. The answer to this question has implications for whether social 
interactions among investors, at least within our setting, are improving price 
efficiency. We examine this issue by constructing long-short portfolios tracking target 
investors’ and their neighbors’ trading decisions. The results are consistent across all 
specifications: stocks bought (in the acquirer industry) subsequently underperform 
stocks sold by these investors (albeit insignificantly), irrespective of the holding 
period and before transaction costs. These results suggest that retail investors, to a 
large extent, exchange noise rather than value-relevant information via word-of-
mouth communication. 
 
2. Data 
2.1. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
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We mainly use two data sources in this study. First, we obtain detailed trading and 
holdings records for a subsample of US households for the period from 1991 through 
1996 from a discount brokerage firm. Our dataset comprises three files. We extract 
information on investor trading in common stocks from the “transaction file”. We 
obtain their end-of-month holdings from the “position file”. Finally, we get various 
household/investor characteristics, such as age, income, and location (zip code), from 
the “information base file”. These three files can be linked by a unique household 
identifier and brokerage account number. Note that one household can have multiple 
accounts at the brokerage firm in our sample. Going forward, we use the terms 
“brokerage account holder” and “investor” interchangeably. For further details on 
this database, we refer the reader to Barber and Odean (2000). 
We match the trading and holdings records to all M&As that take place in 
the same six-year window. We require that the acquirer- and the target firm reside in 
two different industries, where industries are defined based on the Fama-French 49 
industry classification. Using alternative industry classifications, such as the Fama-
French 38 or 30 industry classifications or the GICS industry classification, does not 
change the main results of the paper. We exclude M&As for which we cannot 
identify the acquirer’s or the target’s industry category. We separate M&A deals into 
those that are stock-financed and those that are cash-financed; the former represent 
M&A deals that are at least 50% financed by stock payments, while the latter are 
100% cash-financed.  
Our final sample contains 460 M&As from 1991 through 1996, out of which 
317 are stock-financed and 143 are cash-financed transactions. Panel A of Table 1 
reports summary statistics for these M&A deals. For stock-financed M&As, the 
median acquirer market capitalization is $951 million and the median target market 
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capitalization is $74 million. For cash-financed M&As, the median acquirer market 
capitalization is $1,561 million and the median target market capitalization is $93 
million.  
When matching household trading records to M&A transactions, we require 
each investor in the sample to place at least one trade in either the one-year period 
prior to the M&A or the one-year period after the M&A. We further require that 
these investors have no existing positions in the acquirer industry prior to the M&A 
announcement to avoid trading in the subsequent period due to hedging or 
rebalancing reasons; in particular, target investors that have prior holdings in the 
acquirer industry may mechanically sell their existing holdings upon receiving 
acquirer shares as a way to reduce their exposure to the acquirer industry. 
We end up with a sample of about 70,000 investor accounts (down from 
around 150,000 in the original sample). Panel B of Table 1 provides summary 
characteristics for these accounts. The median and mean portfolio size is $13,141 and 
$41,030, respectively. The average investor holds 3.88 stocks in his/her portfolio and 
places 0.47 trades a month, with the average monthly trade value being $5,679. The 
distributions of these variables are all highly right-skewed, suggesting that there are 
a few wealthy, active investors that account for a considerable portion of holdings- 
and trading activities. The average investor age in our sample is 42 and the average 
annual household income is $69,500. 
We augment our sample with geographic information from the US Census 
Bureaus’ zip code database, which includes the population and the average household 
income for each zip code. Using the home zip codes information in the brokerage 
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database, we compute the distance between any two investors using the longitude 
and latitude associated with each zip code adjusted for curvature.3 
We categorize US zip codes based on various measures of sociability. Similar 
to Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2007), our sociability indices are from the DDB lifestyle 
survey data, which is conducted from 1975 through 1998, and is used in a number of 
sociology studies (e.g., Putnam (2000)). Out of the hundreds of questions asked in 
the survey, we use three indicators: class or seminar attendance, club meeting 
attendance, and community project participation. Since the survey is conducted at 
the state level (i.e., there is an aggregate score for each state), we assign the same 
score to all zip codes within a state.  
 
2.2. Discussion 
The backbone of our analysis is a detailed dataset on individual investor trading 
behavior in the early 1990s. We focus on this particular setting to carry out our 
empirical estimation of the communication rate and its determinants for a number of 
reasons. 
First, the median retail investor in this sample holds three stocks. As such, 
substituting any one position (out of three) with another stock from an entirely 
different industry is likely to have a significant impact on the investor’s attention 
and incentives to collect information. In contrast, institutional investors, on average, 
hold over 100 stocks in their portfolios that span a diverse set of industries. Thus, 
any switch in position is likely to have a much-diminished impact on institutional 
investors’ information gathering activity. 
                                                            
3 The formula is: distance(a,b) = arccos(cos(a1)cos(a2)cos(b1)cos(b2) + cos(a1)sin(a2)cos(b1)sin(b2) + 
sin(a1)sin(b1)) * 3963, where aଵ and bଵ (aଶ and bଶ) are the latitudes (longitudes) of the two zip codes 
and 3963 miles is the radius of the Earth. 
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Second, our empirical design requires a simple environment, in which we can 
cleanly measure the “distance” between any two investors. With the emergence of 
internet and mobile communication, physical distances no longer represent a 
meaningful barrier to communication as a substantial portion of communication is 
now carried out through the internet. As a result, we choose a period that predates 
the internet age. 
Third, our discount brokerage dataset provides detailed information not only 
on the trading- and holdings decisions of a large sample of retail investors, but also 
on their physical locations and social characteristics, both of which are required for 
our empirical analyses. 
Given that we focus on a particular sample of households in the early 1990s, 
our empirical design is also subject to a few caveats. First, the landscape of the U.S. 
equity market has changed dramatically in the past three decades. The fraction of 
shares held directly by households has steadily decreased from nearly 50% in 1990 to 
less than 20% today. This raises questions of whether we can extrapolate our results 
to today’s marketplace.  
Second, the set of households in our sample is not randomly drawn — by 
construction, they are all clients of the same discount brokerage firm. To the extent 
that having a common broker is an indication of belonging to the same social 
network, our sample of households is likely to be better connected to one another 
than the average U.S. household. Our estimate of the baseline communication rate is 
therefore likely to be upward biased.  
Third, the average rate of communication is also constantly changing. People 
used to rely on face-to-face communication to disseminate information or noise. With 
the advancement in information technology and social media, more and more of the 
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daily social interaction has shifted from meeting in a coffee shop to remote, online 
communication. As a result, the speed of communication is orders of magnitudes 
faster than that two or three decades ago.  
In light of all these caveats, the focus of this paper is not the base rate of 
communication (which is estimated from a non-representative sample of U.S. 
households and is unlikely to hold constant over time). Rather, the main objective is 
to estimate how the communication rate varies with geographic and social distances. 
For example, for a ten-year increase in age difference, the communication rate 
between two people drops by X%. To the extent that there are inherent components 
in social structures and norms, the determinants of the communication rate (i.e., the 
slope estimates) are more likely to generalize to different investor groups as well as 
across time. 
 
3. A Static Setting 
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the causal impact of social interactions 
on investor trading behavior and quantify the intensity of the communication effect. 
This section provides evidence on the impact of social interactions on investor 
trading behavior. The next section quantifies the intensity of the communication 
effect and examines what factors and to what degree each of the factors increase or 
decrease the likelihood of a word-of-mouth epidemic. 
Our innovation is to use stock-financed M&As as a source of exogenous 
variation in investors’ portfolios. Specifically, we exploit the fact that investors in the 
target firm, at M&A completion, receive some shares of the acquiring firm. Our 
empirical approach rests on two simple premises. First, investors’ decision to invest 
in the target firm is not driven by their desire to invest in the acquirer firm through 
12 
the M&A. Second, upon endowment of acquirer shares, target investors start to 
gather information on the acquirer industry (e.g., to find a good time to exit); 
further, they spread their newly acquired views and opinions to other investors in the 
same community through word-of-mouth. The first assumptions appears innocent as 
investors interested in the acquiring firm can purchase acquirer shares directly in the 
secondary market without having to worry that the M&A falls apart. The next 
subsection assesses the validity of the second assumption. 
 
3.1 Target Investors 
We assume that target investors start to collect information on the acquirer industry 
after becoming owners of the acquirer firm. Since we do not directly observe 
investors’ information set, we instead focus on their trading decisions, which 
ultimately are dictated by their information. We exclude the acquirer firm from our 
calculation of trading frequency to avoid any mechanical effect, as target investors 
are bound to sell their holdings in the acquirer firm in the following period. We 
further require that investors in our sample do not hold any stocks in the acquirer 
industry before the M&A announcement to avoid trading in the acquirer industry in 
the post-M&A period due to hedging or rebalancing concerns. 
More specifically, we estimate the following linear regression equation: 
 
ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃_ܨݎ݁ݍ௜,௠,஺௖௤ 	ൌ 	ܽ଴ ൅	ܽଵ	ܶܽݎ݃݁ݐ_ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݋ݎ௜,௠ 	൅ 	ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ	ߛ	 ൅	ߝ௜,௝,௧, (1) 
	
where Trading_Freqi,m,Acq is the trading by investor ݅  in the acquirer industry 
(excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of her total trading across all industries 
after stock-financed M&A ݉ . Trading in each period is measured by both the 
number of trades and dollar value of trades. Since the completion date is missing for 
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many M&A deals, we examine trading behavior in months 6 to 18 after the 
announcement day. We skip six months in our analysis because it takes, on average, 
six months for a M&A to complete. The main independent variable in the regression 
is Target_Investori,m, which is a indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
investor ݅  holds shares in the target firm in the month before the M&A 
announcement. In robustness checks, we define target investors based on their 
holdings one year prior to the M&A announcement (at which point retail investors 
are unlikely to have been able to forecast future M&A activities) and our main 
results still go through. 
 The set of control variables in the regression can be broadly categorized into 
two groups: investor/household characteristics and demographic characteristics. The 
former includes the household income, number of children, number of family member, 
the investor’s age, gender, and marital status; the latter includes the zip code 
population, fraction of male residents, average home value, number of household 
members, and household income. We also include a set of M&A dummies in the 
regression to absorb any M&A-specific effects. The standard errors are clustered at 
the zip-code- and time levels. 
 The regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 2. The dependent 
variable in the first four columns is the trading frequency in the acquirer industry 
based on the number of trades, and that in the next four columns is based on the 
dollar value of trades. As shown in Column (1), target investors increase their 
trading intensity in the acquirer industry by an additional 2.48% compared with 
other investors (t-statistic = 5.40). To put this number in perspective, the 
unconditional trading frequency in any industry is 2.04%. In other words, ownership 
of acquirer stocks induces target investors to more than double their normal trading 
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activities in the acquirer industry. Further, as can be seen in Columns (2)-(4), 
controlling for investor and demographic characteristics and M&A-fixed effects has 
virtually no impact on our results.  
Regression coefficients reported in Columns (5)-(8), which are based on a 
dollar-weighted measure of trading intensity, are almost identical to those in 
Columns (1)-(4). For instance, in the full specification, target investors increase their 
trading intensity in the acquirer industry by 2.03% more than other investors (t-
statistic = 4.32).  
While these results are consistent with the notion that stock ownership 
induces investors to collect information on related stocks and ultimately trade on 
these stocks, there are alternative interpretations. In particular, consider the 
possibility that target investors are economically linked to the target firm (e.g., 
target investors are employees of the target firm, or work for suppliers or customers 
of the target firm). After the M&A, these target investors become affiliated with the 
acquirer firm. Emboldened by such affiliation, target investors believe they now 
understand the acquirer’s business better, and start trading more comfortably and 
frequently in other firms in the acquirer industry. 
To address this alternative interpretation, we perform the same sets of tests 
around cash-financed M&As. If our results are truly driven by M&As directly 
impacting investor beliefs and preferences, we should observe a similar change in 
trading intensity around cash-financed M&As. In contrast, if our results are due to 
stock ownership inducing investors to collect more information, we should observe no 
effect for cash-financed M&As.  
The results are reported in Panel B. The coefficients are only one fourth of 
those reported in Panel A and they are far from being statistically significant. Taken 
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together, the results shown in this section confirm our suspicion that when endowed 
with shares of a firm, investors start gathering information about the firm’s 
underlying business and increase their trading in related firms in the same industry. 
 
3.2 Target Neighbors 
We now turn to neighbors of target investors. Unlike prior studies that examine the 
relation between local investors and firms, we use a rather narrow definition of 
neighbors — households that live within a three-mile radius (as opposed to 60 miles). 
This is because the likelihood of two individuals coming into direct contact with each 
other diminishes rapidly with distance.  
We estimate a regression equation similar to equation (1): 
 
ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃_ܨݎ݁ݍ௜,௠,஺௖௤ 	ൌ 	ܽ଴ ൅	ܽଵ	ܶܽݎ݃݁ݐ_݄ܾܰ݁݅݃݋ݎ௜,௠ 	൅ 	ߛ	ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ൅	ߝ௜,௝,௧,		 (2) 
	
where Target_Neighbori,m is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
investor ݅ lives within a three-mile radius of any target investor and is not a target 
investor him-/herself. If an investor lives within three miles of more than one target 
investor, we only count that investor once. In unreported analyses, we assign more 
weights to neighbors of multiple target investors, and the results are by and large 
unchanged. We also require that investors in our sample do not hold stocks in the 
acquirer industry prior to the M&A announcement. 
 Panel A of Table 3 reports target neighbors’ trading behavior around stock-
financed M&As. Similar to Table 2, the dependent variable in the first four columns 
of Panel A is the trading intensity in the acquirer industry based on the number of 
trades, while the dependent variable in the next four columns is the trading intensity 
in the acquirer industry based on the dollar value of trades. As can be seen from 
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Column (1), neighbors who live within three miles of target investors 
disproportionately increase their trading intensity in the acquirer industry by 39bps 
after the M&A (t-statistic = 4.88). Controlling for investor- and demographic 
characteristics and M&A-fixed effects only mildly reduces the coefficient estimates. 
In the full specification, the coefficient on Target_Neighbor remains as high as 23bps 
with a t-statistic of 3.29. That is, target neighbors increase their trading intensity by 
over ten percent of the unconditional trading intensity in a given industry, which is 
2.04%. The results based on dollar value of trades, shown in the next four columns, 
are virtually identical to those reported in the first four columns. The coefficient 
estimate on Target_Neighbor in the full specification is 22bps with a t-statistic of 
3.14. 
 Comparing the results shown in Panel A of Table 2 with those in Panel A of 
Table 3, we observe that the effect of stock-financed M&As on target investors’ 
trading intensity is about ten times as large as that on target neighbors’ trading 
intensity (2.30% vs. 23bp). This difference in magnitude is consistent with prior 
word-of-mouth studies. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004), for instance, find that “a 
given fund manager’s purchases of a stock increase by roughly 0.13 percentage points 
when other managers from different fund families in the same city increase their 
purchase of the same stock by 1 percentage point.” Similarly, Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2007) report that “a ten percentage point increase in neighbors’ 
purchases of stocks from an industry is associated with a two percentage point 
increase in households’ own purchases of stocks from that industry,” and they 
attribute “approximately one-quarter to one-half of the correlation between 
households’ stock purchases and stock purchases made by their neighbors to word-of-
mouth communication.” 
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 We again replicate the whole set of analyses for cash-financed M&As. If 
neighbors of target investors increase their trading in the acquirer industry because 
the M&A directly impacts neighbors’ beliefs or preferences (through economic 
affiliations), we should observe a similar pattern in trading around cash-financed 
M&As. In contrast, if neighbors of target investors increase their trading because of 
word-of-mouth communication with target investors, we expect cash-financed M&As 
to have no impact on neighbors’ trading decisions.  
The regression results, shown in Panel B of Table 3, are consistent with the 
latter explanation. The coefficient estimate on Target_Neighbor in the full 
specification (Columns (4) and (8)) is almost zero, with a t-statistic below 0.3. 
Another related concern is that cross-industry M&As cause acquirer- and 
target industry to be discussed jointly in the media, which, in turn, causes investors 
to trade in both industries. The non-result for cash-financed M&As does not 
corroborate this alternative view of the data. To further investigate this channel, we 
look at investors that, at the time of the M&A, hold shares in the target industry, 
but not the target firm itself. We then examine their subsequent trading behavior in 
the acquirer industry as well as that of their neighbors. The results are reported in 
Table 4. Similar to the placebo test based on cash-financed M&A, we observe no 
increase in trading activity in the acquirer industry. This applies to both “target” 
investors and their neighbors. 
 
3.3 Alternative Specifications 
If social interactions play a major role, we expect the documented pattern to vary 
substantially with our definition of neighbors and with the time horizon over which 
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we analyze the trades. All our analyses discussed in this subsection are tabulated in 
Appendix A1.  
In our first set of tests, we vary the distance over which we define neighbors. 
When we increase the distance from 3 to 7 miles and exclude both target investors 
and target neighbors within three miles from the sample, the coefficient estimate on 
Target_Neighbor in the full regression specification using the dollar-weighted 
measure of trading intensity drops by about 20% to 18bp (from 22bp). As we further 
increase the distance to 15 miles, the coefficient estimate on Target_Neighbor drops 
by another 20% to 14bp. Both estimates remain statistically significant at all 
conventional levels. Stock-financed M&As have virtually no impact on neighbors that 
reside between 15 and 30 miles of a target investor and neighbors that are more than 
30 miles away. We make almost identical observations when switching the dependent 
variable to trading intensity based on the number of trades. This rapid decrease in 
coefficient estimates is consistent with the idea that word-of-mouth effects decay 
quickly with distance. 
We also experiment with the time period over which we measure investors’ 
trading intensity. Specifically, instead of focusing on the one-year period after M&A 
completion (i.e., months 6-18 after M&A announcement), we expand our window to 
years two and three. 
Irrespective of the dependent variable, we find that target investors gradually 
reduce their trading intensity in the acquirer industry compared with other investors. 
In the baseline regression, target investors exhibit a trading propensity in the 
acquirer industry that is 2.30% higher than the rest of the investors in months 6-18 
after the M&A announcement (Table 2, Panel A, Column (4)). This figure drops to 
1.78% in months 18-30, and to 1.23% in months 30-42. The drop in trading 
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propensity for target neighbors is even more pronounced. There is no discernible 
difference in trading intensity between target neighbors and other investors beyond 
month 18: The coefficient estimate on Target_Neighbor is 5bp and 1bp in months 
18-30 and months 30-42, respectively, and both are statistically insignificant. 
We also test what happens during months 1 to 5. In particular, an attention-
based explanation of our findings is that shareholders of target firms and their 
neighbors trade similarly because they are exposed to common information due to 
local media and spillover effects. If so, our patterns should be stronger around the 
M&A announcement date, not the completion date. We find that target investors 
and target neighbors trade more frequently from month 7-18 in the acquirer firms’ 
industry than during months 1-6, which suggests that our results are not driven by 
an attention effect or common information story.  
 
4. A Dynamic Setting 
Having provided some baseline evidence on the impact of social interactions on 
investor trading behavior, we now attempt to examine what factors affect the speed 
of communication.  
In essence, we estimate a transmission matrix that quantifies how views and 
opinions percolate through households from one month to another: 
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where Xi,t is the trading activity of household i in the acquirer industry in period t 
and Xi,t+1 is the trading activity of household i in the acquirer industry in period t+1. 
To express this transmission matrix in a vector form, we have 
ܺ௧ାଵ ൌ ܤ ∗ ܺ௧. 
While in the previous regression equation, we estimate to what degree 
“patient zero” increases trading in the target industry for households that live within 
a three-mile radius, we now dynamically estimate the cumulative effect from being a 
neighbor of patient zero, being a neighbor of a neighbor of patient zero, etc. Put 
differently, we now estimate not only the fraction of “primary-case infected”, but 
also the fraction of “secondary-case infected” in period t+1, the fraction of “tertiary-
case infected” in period t+2 etc. Accumulating this over p periods, we get 
ܺ௧ା௣ ൌ ܤ ∗ ܺ௧ା௣ିଵ ൌ ܤ௣ ∗ ܺ௧. 
We employ a two-stage approach to estimate the matrix B. In the first stage, 
we instrument the set of independent variables, Xt through Xt+p-1, using portfolio 
shocks experienced by target investors at the merger completion date. Specifically, 
we estimate regression equations of trading activity by household i in the acquirer 
industry on Targeti, which is a dummy variable that equals one if investor i was 
holding target shares at the time of the M&A announcement. Trading activity in the 
acquirer industry is defined as the total number of trades (or total dollar value of 
trades) in the acquirer industry divided by the total number of trades (total dollar 
value of trades) across all industries. 
The results from the first-stage regressions are reported in Table 5. We find 
that trading activity in the acquirer industry increases with the presence of target 
investors at all horizons, from six months following the M&A to seventeen months 
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following the M&A. This pattern emerges irrespective of whether we measure trading 
activity based on the number of trades or the dollar value of trades. 
In the second stage, we estimate how trading activity in the acquirer industry 
in period t+p relates to the fitted trading activity in the acquirer industry in period 
t+p-1 from the first-stage regression, where p ranges from 1 to 12: 
ܺ௧ାଵ ൌ ܤ ∗ ܺ௧෢ ൅ ݁௧ାଵ ൌ ܤ ∗ ܺ௧෢ ൅ ߳௧ାଵ 
ܺ௧ାଶ ൌ ܤଶ ∗ ௧ܺ෢ ൅ ݁௧ାଶ ൌ ܤ ∗ ܺ௧ାଵ෣൅ ߳௧ାଶ 
… 
ܺ௧ାଵଶ ൌ ܤଵଶ ∗ ܺ௧෢ ൅ ݁௧ାଵଶ ൌ ܤ ∗ ௧ܺାଵଵ෣ ൅ ߳௧ାଵଶ. 
Our focus centers on the matrix of beta coefficients, which capture the speed 
at which the information spreads. We conjecture the speed of communication to be a 
function of (1) Distij, which is the geographic distance between households i and j, 
(2) |Incomeij|, which is the income gap between households i and j, (3) |Ageij|, which 
is the age gap between the “heads” of households i and j, 4 and (4) |Genderij|, which is 
the gender gap between the “heads” of households i and j. We further include state 
dummies in the equation to estimate the (residual) state-fixed effects (after 
controlling for the observables) in the communication rate, and correlate these state 
effects with existing proxies for sociability. 
To facilitate the computation of the matrix of beta coefficients, we impose a 
linear structure on all of the elements in the transmission matrix: 
ߚ௜,௝	 ൌ ܾ଴	 ൅ ܾଵ	 ∗ ܦ݅ݏݐ௜,௝	 ൅ ܾଶ	 ∗ |ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁ܦ݂݅ ௜݂,௝	 | 
																						൅ܾଷ	 ∗ |ܣ݃݁ܦ݂݅ ௜݂,௝	 | ൅ ܾସ	 ∗ |ܩ݁݊݀݁ݎܦ݂݅ ௜݂,௝	 | ൅ ߝ௜,௝	 , 
                                                            
4 “Heads” of households are those that are registered as the primary brokerage account holders. 
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where ߝ௜,௝	  captures the unobserved determinants of ߚ௜,௝	 , and b0 captures the baseline 
communication rate with zero distance in every social dimension. Scaling our 
estimates of b1, b2, b3, and b4 by our estimate of b0 therefore yields the proportional 
change in the communication rate as a function of social distances.  
The results are reported in Table 6. The estimate for the baseline 
communication rate b0 equals 0.334 in Column (1) and 0.332 in Column (3) 
depending on whether trading activity is based on the number of trades or the dollar 
value of trades, respectively. As alluded to in Section 2.2, we believe these two 
estimates to be upward biased (relative to the average U.S. households). Despite this 
upward bias, our estimates are far below one and the equivalent basic reproduction 
ratios of some of the most studied diseases such as HIV/AIDS, SARS and Ebola. In 
other words, unlike infectious diseases, which require counter-measures such as 
isolation or vaccine to contain the epidemic, our baseline communication rate with 
zero distance in all observable social dimensions implies that industry information 
gathered by “patient zero” is unlikely to trigger an epidemic. Instead, the 
communication effect can be expected to die out. 
The coefficients on the age, income, and gender differences suggest that the 
communication rate varies significantly with social closeness/distance. In particular, 
when scaling our estimates of b2, b3, and b4 by our estimate of b0, our results suggest 
that a ten-year difference in age, a one-step difference in income, and having a 
different gender lower the communication rate by 12%, 14%, and 32%, respectively. 
That is, under certain conditions, the communication effect can be expected to die 
out rather quickly, whereas under alternate conditions, the communication effect can 
be expected to die out very slowly. 
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5. Value-Relevant News Transmission or Spreading of Noise? 
In our final test, we examine whether investors in our setting transmit value-relevant 
news or simply spread noise. The answer to this question has important implications 
about whether social interactions among investors, at least within our setting, are 
improving market efficiency or adding noise to the price.  
We examine this issue via long-short portfolios across target investors and 
their neighbors. At the end of each month t, we look at all stocks in the acquirer 
industry excluding the acquirer firm itself that were bought and all stocks in the 
acquirer industry excluding the acquirer firm itself that were sold by target investors 
and their neighbors during month t. We experiment with three portfolio construction 
schemes:  
1) For each stock in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer itself), we 
compute the total number of shares bought by target investors and their neighbors 
minus the total number of shares sold. We go long the stocks for which these 
investors are net buyers and go short the stocks for which they are net sellers. The 
long and short portfolios are then weighted by the net trading across all target 
investors and target neighbors, and are held for one month up to one year.  
2) For each stock in the acquirer industry, we compute the total dollar value 
of shares bought minus the total dollar value of shares sold. We form long-short 
portfolios as above.  
3) For each stock in the acquirer industry, we compute the aggregate portfolio 
weight change across all target investors and their neighbors. We form long-short 
portfolios as in 1). 
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The results are reported in Table 7. Irrespective of the portfolio formation 
scheme, we find that the long portfolio subsequently underperforms the short 
portfolio, albeit not statistically significantly so. These results suggest that the newly 
acquired views and opinions about firms in the acquirer industry mostly reflect noise 
rather than value-relevant news. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Exploiting cross-industry stock-financed M&As as a source of plausibly exogenous 
shocks to investors’ portfolio composition, we examine the intensity with which 
investors communicate with one another, as well as the determinants of the 
communication rate. Specifically, our empirical strategy rests upon the simple 
premise that once endowed with shares of the acquiring firm, target investors start 
paying attention to and gathering information about the acquirer industry; more 
importantly, target investors communicate their views and opinions to other 
investors residing in the same neighborhood, as geographic proximity facilitates the 
exchange of ideas via word-of-mouth. 
 We conduct two sets of tests to quantify the impact of word-of-mouth 
communication on investor behavior. First, in a static setting, we show that in the 
year after M&A completion, target investors double their trading activity in the 
acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) relative to other investors in the 
sample. Moreover, neighbors of target investors that live within a three-mile radius 
increase their trading intensity in the acquirer industry by more than 11% during the 
same period. Consistent with the communication channel, we show in a series of 
placebo tests that our results disappear if we instead a) use cash-financed M&As 
(where target investors receive cash as opposed to shares of the acquirer firm), and b) 
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focus on pseudo target firms — i.e., firms in the same industry as the actual target 
firm and with similar characteristics. 
Our second set of tests draws from research on disease transmission. Using 
essentially a VAR approach, we estimate a transmission matrix to quantify how 
views and opinions percolate across investors from one period to the next. For 
simplicity, we assume that all elements in the transmission matrix are linear 
functions of distances in social characteristics, such as age, income, and gender. 
Quantitatively, our estimates imply that a ten-year difference in age, a one-step 
difference in income, and having a different gender lower the communication rate by 
12%, 14%, and 32%, respectively. Moreover, at the state level, we find a large 
positive correlation between our estimated state-average communication rate that is 
extracted from investors’ trading behavior and the various components of the 
sociability index compiled from survey data. 
Finally, we examine whether target investors and neighbors are trading on 
superior value-relevant news or responding to noise. Our results, consistent aross all 
specifications, suggest that retail investors, to a large extent, exchange noise rather 
than useful value-relevant news via casual, word-of-mouth communication. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of our sample. Panel A presents statistics for the M&A sample 
from the SDC database. Stock-financed M&As are defined as those at least partially financed by stocks; 
cash-financed M&As are 100% financed by cash. Firm size is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the share price as of the month prior to the M&A [millions]. Panel B shows 
investor- and portfolio characteristics for the retail investor sample used in Baber and Odean (2001). 
We only include retail investors who have perform at least one trade in the two year window surrounding 
the M&A; we further require that investors do not trade or hold any stocks from the acquirer industry 
in the two year window surrounding the M&A. Portfolio size is the dollar value of the stock holdings. 
Number and value of trades are the total number of trades and the total dollar value of trades. All 
observations are at the account/year-month level. Panel C shows demographic information for each zip 
code in our sample. All observations are at the zip-code/year-month level. The three sociability indices 
are: Class or Seminar Attendance, Club Meeting Attendance, and Community Project Participation all 
of which are measured at the state/year level. 
 
 N 
 
25% Median 75% Mean Std. Dev. 
Panel A: M&A Sample Characteristics 
 
Stock-Financed M&As       
Acquirer Firm Size ($million) 317 217 951 2,920 2,742 5,504 
Target Firm Size ($million) 317 31 74 250 651 2,370 
Cash-Financed M&As       
Acquirer Firm Size ($million) 143 391 1,561 4,491 5,541 12,970 
Target Firm Size ($million) 143 30 93 216 266 585 
       
Panel B: Investor/Portfolio Characteristics 
 
Portfolio Size ($) 70,608 5,513 13,141 31,818 41,030 216,539 
Number of Stocks Held  70,608 1 2 5 3.88 5.03 
Number of Trades Each Month 70,608 0 0 0 0.47 1.76 
Value of Trades Each Month 
($) 70,608 0 0 0 5,679 76,056 
Investor Age 70,608 36 46 56 42.02 21.44 
Investor Income ($) 70,608 45,000 62,500 87,500 69,500 30,064 
       
Panel C: Zip Code Characteristics 
 
Basic Characteristics 
Population 42,057 785 2,777 11,960 8,965 13,134 
No. Household Members 42,057 2.40 2.56 2.73 2.59 0.35 
House Value ($) 42,057 58,200 82,900 122,300 105,359 89,589 
Household Income ($) 42,057 29,779 36,250 45,750 39,631 16,243 
Sociability Indices (measured at the state level) 
Class or Seminar Attendance 294 1.88 2.03 2.23 2.07 0.31 
Club Meeting Attendance 294 2.07 2.26 2.45 2.29 0.41 
Community Project 
Participation 294 1.47 1.57 1.70 1.60 0.22 
       
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Target Investors’ Trading in the Acquirer Industry 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of investors trading in the acquirer industry on a target investor dummy. The observations are at an 
event/brokerage account/year-month level. The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(4) is the number of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer 
firm) as a fraction of the total number of trades across all industries in months six to eighteen after the M&A is announced. The dependent variable in Columns 
(5)-(8) is the dollar value of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of the total dollar value of trades across all industries in 
months six to eighteen after the M&A is announced. We skip six months because it takes an average of six months for the M&A to complete after its initial 
announcement. The main independent variable is an indicator, which equals one if the account holder possesses shares of the target stock at the end of the 
month prior to the M&A announcement. Investor-level controls include the account holder’s income, age, number of children, number of family members, gender, 
and marital status. Zip-code-level controls include the zip-code population, fraction of male residents, average home value, number of household members, and 
household income. We only consider account holders who perform at least one trade in the two year window surrounding the M&A; we further require that 
investors do not trade or hold any stocks from the acquirer industry in the year prior to the M&A. Panel A reports regression results for stock-financed M&As. 
Panel B reports regression results for cash-financed M&As. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the zip-code- and time levels. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Stock-Financed M&As 
 
Target Investor 
 
0.0248*** 
[0.0046] 
0.0248*** 
[0.0046] 
0.0230*** 
[0.0047] 
0.0230*** 
[0.0047] 
0.0220*** 
[0.0045] 
0.0219*** 
[0.0045] 
0.0204*** 
[0.0047] 
0.0203*** 
[0.0047] 
Investor Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Zip Code Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Event-Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.00% 0.01% 1.65% 1.66% 0.00% 0.01% 1.59% 1.59% 
No. Obs. 7,598,715 7,598,715 7,598,715 7,598,715 7,598,715 7,598,715 7,598,715 7,598,715 
Panel B: Cash-Financed M&As 
 
Target Investor 
 
0.0046 
[0.0037] 
0.0046 
[0.0037] 
0.0044 
[0.0035] 
0.0043 
[0.0035] 
0.0061 
[0.0042] 
0.0061 
[0.0042] 
0.0059 
[0.0040] 
0.0059 
[0.0040] 
Investor Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Zip Code Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Event-Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.00% 0.01% 2.36% 2.37% 0.00% 0.01% 2.25% 2.26% 
No. Obs. 3,489,281 3,489,281 3,489,281 3,489,281 3,489,281 3,489,281 3,489,281 3,489,281 
 
 
Table 3. Target Neighbours’ Trading in the Acquirer Industry 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of investors trading in the acquirer industry on a target neighbour dummy. The observations are at an 
event/brokerage account/year-month level. The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(4) is the number of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer 
firm) as a fraction of the total number of trades across all industries in months six to eighteen after the M&A is announced. The dependent variable in Columns 
(5)-(8) is the dollar value of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of the total dollar value of trades across all industries in 
months six to eighteen after the M&A is announced. We skip six months because it takes an average of six months for the M&A to complete after its initial 
announcement. The main independent variable is an indicator, which equals one if the account holder lives within three miles of a target investor and is not a 
target investor him-/herself. Investor-level controls include the account holder’s income, age, number of children, number of family members, gender, and marital 
status. Zip-code-level controls include the zip-code population, fraction of male residents, average home value, number of household members, and household 
income. We only consider account holders who perform at least one trade in the two year window surrounding the M&A; we further require that investors do 
not trade or hold any stocks from the acquirer industry in the year prior to the M&A. Panel A reports regression results for stock-financed M&As. Panel B 
reports regression results for cash-financed M&As. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the zip-code- and time levels. *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Stock-Financed M&As 
 
Target Neighbour 
 
0.0039*** 
[0.0008] 
0.0044*** 
[0.0007] 
0.0021*** 
[0.0007] 
0.0023*** 
[0.0007] 
0.0037*** 
[0.0008] 
0.0041*** 
[0.0008] 
0.0019*** 
[0.0007] 
0.0022*** 
[0.0007] 
Investor Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Zip Code Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Event-Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.00% 0.01% 1.65% 1.66% 0.00% 0.01% 1.59% 1.59% 
No. Obs. 7,596,415 7,596,415 7,596,415 7,596,415 7,596,415 7,596,415 7,596,415 7,596,415 
Panel B: Cash-Financed M&As 
 
Target Neighbour 
 
0.0010 
[0.0012] 
0.0015 
[0.0011] 
-0.0001 
[0.0010] 
0.0003 
[0.0010] 
0.0009 
[0.0012] 
0.0014 
[0.0012] 
-0.0002 
[0.0010] 
0.0002 
[0.0010] 
Investor Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Zip Code Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Event-Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.00% 0.01% 2.36% 2.37% 0.00% 0.01% 2.25% 2.26% 
No. Obs. 3,488,558 3,488,558 3,488,558 3,488,558 3,488,558 3,488,558 3,488,558 3,488,558 
 
 
Table 4. Placebo Test: Investors Holding Other Stocks in the Target Industry 
 
This table repeats the analyses reported in Tables 2 and 3, but now replaces target investors with investors that, at the time of the M&A, hold shares in the 
target industry, but not the target firm itself. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) report regression results for stock-financed M&As, which are defined as acquisitions 
that are at least partially financed by stocks. Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) report regression results for cash-financed M&As, which are defined as acquisitions 
that are 100% financed by cash. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the zip-code- and time levels. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Target Investors 
 
Target Neighbours 
 Stock M&As 
 
Cash M&As 
 
Stock M&As 
 
Cash M&As 
 
 
 
(1) 
# Trades  
 
(2) 
$Trades 
 
(3) 
# Trades 
 
(4) 
$Trades 
 
 
(5) 
# Trades 
 
(6) 
$Trades 
 
(7) 
# Trades 
 
(8) 
$Trades 
 
“Target” Investor/Neighbour 
 
0.0006 
[0.0018] 
-0.0006 
[0.0019] 
-0.0009 
[0.0028] 
-0.0003 
[0.0030] 
-0.0003 
[0.0006] 
-0.0003 
[0.0006] 
0.0005 
[0.0008] 
0.0004 
[0.0008] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R2 1.66% 1.59% 2.36% 2.25% 1.66% 1.59% 2.36% 2.25% 
No. Obs. 7,558,105 7,558,105 3,476,999 3,476,999 7,555,604 7,555,604 3,475,477 3,475,477 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Communication Speed: First-Stage 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of trading activity in the acquirer industry on a target investor dummy. We focus on stock-based M&As 
and regressions are estimated separately for each event month, from six months following the stock-based M&A to seventeen months following the stock-based 
M&A. The observations are at an event/zip-code/year-month level. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the total number of trades in the acquirer industry 
in the zip code as a fraction of the total number of trades across all industries in the zip code. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the total dollar value of 
trades in the acquirer industry in the zip code as a fraction of the total dollar value of trades across all industries in the zip code. We skip six months because 
it takes an average of six months for the M&A to complete after its initial announcement. The main independent variable is an indicator, which equals one if 
there is a target investor in the zip code in question. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the event level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Trading Frequency 
 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 
Intercept 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Target Investor 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]  [0.003] 
             
Panel B: Dollar-Based Trading Frequency 
 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 
Intercept 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 
Target Investor 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Communication Speed: Second Stage 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from second-stage regressions of total trading activity in a 
household in the acquirer industry on its lagged own trading, lagged average trading of the neighbours 
and its interactions with physical and social distances. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) 
is the number of trades in the acquirer industry as a fraction of the total number of trades across all 
industries in months 7 to 18 after the stock-financed M&A is announced. The dependent variable in 
Columns (3) and (4) is the dollar value of trades in the acquirer industry as a fraction of the total dollar 
value of trades in months 7 to 18 after the M&A is announced. ?????i,t is the projected amount of 
trading by all neighbour residents based on the first-stage regressions reported in Table 5. Columns (1) 
and (3) only consider neighbours living within 3 miles, while Columns (2) and (4) consider neighbours 
living 3 to 7 miles aways. Avg(?????j,t) is the average projected amount of trading of their neighbours 
based on the first-stage regressions reported in Table 5. Disti,j is the distance between zip codes i and j. 
Agei is the average age of all residents in zip code i. Incomei is the average income of all residents in zip 
code i; Genderi is the fraction of male in zip code i. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at 
event level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
DepVar=Tradei,t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
?????i,t 0.736*** 0.753*** 0.723*** 0.741*** 
 [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030] 
Avg(?????j,t) 0.334*** 0.345*** 0.332*** 0.355*** 
 [0.027] [0.052] [0.027] [0.053] 
Avg(?????j,t *Disti,j) -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.021*** -0.029*** 
 [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] 
Avg(?????j,t *|Agei-Agej|) -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Avg(?????j,t *|Incomei-Incomej|) -0.006** -0.012*** -0.006** -0.012*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] 
Avg(?????j,t *|Genderi--Genderj|) -0.176*** -0.168*** -0.178*** -0.170*** 
 [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] 
     
Adj. R2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
No. Obs. 4,782,541 4,782,541 4,782,541 4,782,541 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 7. Returns to Target Investor/Neighbour Trading 
 
This table reports monthly returns of hedge portfolios that go long stocks bought by and short stocks 
sold by target investors and target neighbours. Panels A and B use information from the trade file in 
the retail broker database. In Panel A, the long and short portfolios are weighted by the number of 
shares traded by each investor over the previous twelve months, and portfolios are held for one month. 
In Panel B, the long and short portfolios are weighted by the dollar value of shares traded by each 
investor over the previous twelve months, and portfolios are held for one month. Panels C and D use 
information from the holdings file in the retail broker database. In Panel C, the long and short portfolios 
are weighted by the portfolio weight change of each investor over the previous one month, and portfolios 
are held for one month. In Panel D, the long and short portfolios are weighted by the portfolio weight 
change of each investor over the previous month, and portfolios are held for twelve months. We deal 
with overlapping portfolios in each holding month by taking the equal-weighted average return across 
portfolios formed in different months. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on 
standard errors with Newey-West corrections of twelve lags. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Excess Return 
 
CAPM Alpha Three-Factor Alpha Four-Factor Alpha
Panel A: (12, 1) Returns to Portfolios Weighted by Shares Traded 
 
Buy-Sell 
 
-0.35% 
(-1.01) 
-0.24% 
(-0.53) 
-0.15% 
(-0.42) 
-0.13% 
(-0.29) 
N (of Months) 61 61 61 61 
Panel B: (12, 1) Returns to Portfolios Weighted by Trading Value 
 
Buy-Sell 
 
-0.36% 
(-0.73) 
-0.13% 
(-0.23) 
-0.16% 
(-0.28) 
-0.02% 
(-0.04) 
N (of Months) 61 61 61 61 
Panel C: (1, 1) Returns to Portfolios Weighted by Portfolio Weight Changes 
 
Buy-Sell 
 
-1.14% 
(-0.90) 
-1.29% 
(-1.01) 
-0.69% 
(-0.69) 
-0.33% 
(-0.29) 
N (of Months) 61 61 61 61 
Panel D: (1, 12) Returns to Portfolios Weighted by Portfolio Weight Changes 
 
Buy-Sell 
 
-0.32% 
(-1.24) 
-0.26% 
(-0.99) 
-0.24% 
(-0.98) 
-0.17% 
(-0.71) 
N (of Months) 61 61 61 61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Heat map of Communication Speed (Trading Frequency) 
This figure shows the U.S Heat map for our estimates of state-level communication speed calculated 
from regressions presented in Table 5. The dependent variable is the number of trades in the acquirer 
industry as a fraction of the total number of trades across all industries. In addition to the control 
variables included in Column (1) of Table 5, we allow the coefficient estimate on Avg(Tradej) to vary 
across states. The correlation between our estimate of communication speed and the Social Index 
mapped in Figure 1 is 0.43 with a p-value below 0.01.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. U.S. Heat map of Communication Speed (Dollar-Based Trading Frequency) 
This figure shows the U.S Heat map for our estimates of state-level communication speed calculated 
from regressions presented in Table 5. The dependent variable is the dollar value of trades in the acquirer 
industry as a fraction of the total dollar value of trades across all industries. In addition to the control 
variables included in Column (3) of Table 5, we allow the coefficient estimate on Avg(Tradej) to vary 
across states. The correlation between our estimate of communication speed and the Social Index 
mapped in Figure 1 is 0.45 with a p-value below 0.01.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. U.S. Heat map of Social Index 
This figure shows the U.S. Heat map for the Social Index from Putnam (2000), which captures the 
frequency people seek advice from friends. We calculate the average state level indices from 1991-1996.  
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Table A1. Different Definitions of Neighbours and Various Time Horizons 
 
This table reports regressions of investors trading in the acquirer industry on the target investor and 
target neighbour dummies. The dependent variable in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) in both Panels A, 
B and C is the number of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of 
total number of trades across all industries, and that in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) is the dollar value 
of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of total dollar value of 
trades. The main independent variables are the target investor and target neighbour dummies; the 
former takes the value of one if the investor holds the target stock at the end of the month before the 
acquisition announcement and the latter takes the value of one if the investor lives within N miles of 
any target investor (where N varies from 3 to 30 miles) and is not a target investor himself. Investor-
level controls include the investor’s income, age, number of children, number of family member, gender, 
and martial status. Zip code level controls include the zip code population, fraction of male residents, 
average house value, number household members, and household income. We only include in our sample 
retail investors that have at least one trade in the two year window surrounding an acquisition; we 
further require that these investors do not trade or hold any stocks from the acquirer industry in the 
year before the acquisition. Panel A reports regression results for target neighbours that are defined 
using various distances. Panel B reports regression results for trades that take place in various event 
windows. Only stock-financed M&As are considered in these regressions. Panel C reports the difference 
between investors trading frequency in Month 1-6 and Month 7-12. The columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) 
are for stock-financed M&As and we run regression for target-investors and target-neighbours 
respectively. The columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) are for cash-financed M&As and we run regression for 
target-investors and target-neighbours respectively. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at 
zip code and time levels. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
 
 
 
Panel A: Neighbours at Different Distances 
 0 to 3 Miles 3 to 7 Miles 7 to 15 Miles 15 to 30 Miles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Target Neighbour 0.0023*** 0.0022*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0002 0.0002 
 [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 7,596,415 7,596,415 7,558,105 7,558,105 7,485,049 7,485,049 7,336,619 7,336,619
Adj. R2 1.66% 1.59% 1.66% 1.59% 1.65% 1.59% 1.65% 1.58% 
         
Panel B: Various Time Horizons 
  Target Investors   Target Neighbours  
 Months 18 to 30 Months 30 to 42 Months 18 to 30 Months 30 to 42 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Target 0.0178*** 0.0130*** 0.0123*** 0.0107*** 0.0005 0.0008 0.0001 0.0005 
 [0.0030] [0.0026] [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 5,814,983 5,814,983 3,696,168 3,696,168 5,812,950 5,812,950 3,694,682 3,694,682
Adj. R2 1.47% 1.39% 1.28% 1.21% 1.47% 1.39% 1.28% 1.21% 
Panel C: Difference between Month 1-6 and Month 7-18 
  Target Investors   Target Neighbours  
 Stock-Financed M&As Cash-Financed M&As Stock-Financed M&As Cash-Financed M&As
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Target 0.0122*** 0.0118*** 0.0089* 0.0091* 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0008 0.0006 
 [0.0038] [0.0038] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0011] [0.0011] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 4,892,588 4,892,588 2,283,907 2,283,907 4,890,872 4,890,872 2,283,329 2,283,329 
Adj. R2 1.42% 1.38% 2.06% 1.99% 1.41% 1.37% 2.06% 1.98% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. The Effect of Social Groups 
 
This table reports regressions of investors trading in the acquirer industry on the target neighbour 
dummy. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) in both Panels A and B is the number of trades 
in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of total number of trades across all 
industries in months 6 to 18 after an acquisition is announced, and that in columns (2) and (4) is the 
dollar value of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of total dollar 
value of trades in months 6 to 18 after an acquisition is announced. The main independent variable is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the investor lives within 3 miles of any target investor 
and is not a target investor himself. Investor-level controls include the investor’s income, age, number 
of children, number of family member, gender, and martial status. Zip code level controls include the 
zip code population, fraction of male residents, average house value, number household members, and 
household income. We only include in our sample retail investors that have at least one trade in the 
two year window surrounding an acquisition; we further require that these investors do not trade or 
hold any stocks from the acquirer industry in the year before the acquisition. In Panel A, we include in 
columns (1) and (2) all target neighbours that are in the same age group as the target investor and the 
rest in columns (3) and (4). In Panel B, we include in columns (1) and (2) all target neighbours that 
are in the same income group as the target investor and the rest in columns (3) and (4). In Panel C, 
we include in columns (1) and (2) all target neighbours that have lived in the current home for more 
than 5 years and the rest in columns (3) and (4). Only stock-financed M&As are considered in these 
regressions. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at zip code and time levels. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Investor Age 
 Same Age Group Different Age Groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Neighbour 0.0040*** 0.0035*** 0.0011 0.0012 
 [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0008] [0.0008] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 7,596,415 7,596,415 7,581,187 7,581,187 
Adj. R2 1.66% 1.59% 1.66% 1.59% 
     
Panel B: Annual Income 
 Same Income Group Different Income Groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Neighbour 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0011 0.0007 
 [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0014] [0.0014] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 7,596,415 7,596,415 7,566,666 7,566,666 
Adj. R2 1.66% 1.59% 1.66% 1.59% 
 
Panel C: Years in Current Home 
 More Than 5 Years Less Than 5 Years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Neighbour 0.0026*** 0.0027*** 0.0010 0.0001 
 [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0021] [0.0021] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 6,711,168 6,711,168 6,689,865 6,689,865 
Adj. R2 1.73% 1.66% 1.73% 1.65% 
 
 
  
 
 
Table A3. The Effect of Population Density 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of investors trading in the acquirer industry on 
a target neighbour dummy. We focus on stock-financed M&As and the observations are at an 
event/brokerage account/year-month level. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (3) is the 
number of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of the total number 
of trades across all industries in months six to eighteen after the M&A is announced. The dependent 
variable in Columns (2) and (4) is the dollar value of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the 
acquirer firm) as a fraction of the total dollar value of trades across all industries in months six to 
eighteen after the M&A is announced. We skip six months because it takes an average of six months 
for the M&A to complete after its initial announcement. The main independent variable is an indicator, 
which equals one if the account holder lives within three miles of a target investor and is not a target 
investor him-/herself. Investor-level controls include the account holder’s income, age, number of 
children, number of family members, gender, and marital status. Zip-code-level controls include the zip-
code population, fraction of male residents, average home value, number of household members, and 
household income. We only consider account holders who perform at least one trade in the two-year 
window surrounding the M&A; we further require that investors do not trade or hold any stocks from 
the acquirer industry in the year prior to the M&A. In Panel A, we divide all zip codes into those with 
MSA codes (“Metropolitan Areas”) and those without MSA codes (“Rural Areas”). In Panel B, within 
all zip codes with MSA codes, we separate zip codes based on the 75th percentile of the population 
distribution. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the zip-code- and time levels. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Metropolitan vs. Rural Areas 
 Metropolitan Areas Rural Areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Neighbour 0.0021*** 0.0019** 0.0007 0.0011 
 [0.0008] [0.0008] 0.0015 0.0015 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R2 1.85% 1.77% 1.51% 1.45% 
No. Obs. 3,020,577 3,020,577 2,105,810 2,105,810 
 
Panel B: Population Density within Metropolitan Areas 
 < 75th Percentile >= 75th Percentile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Neighbour 0.0026** 0.0025** 0.0011 0.0011 
 [0.0012] [0.00012] 0.0010 0.0010 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R2 1.73% 1.64% 1.99% 1.94% 
No. Obs. 1,510,209 1,510,209 1,436,074 1,436,074 
  
 
 
Table A4. Target Investors Based on Lagged One Year Holdings 
 
This table reports regressions of investors trading in the acquirer industry on the target investor and 
target neighbour dummies. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) in both Panels A and B is 
the number of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of total number 
of trades across all industries in months 6 to 18 after an acquisition is announced, and that in columns 
(2) and (4) is the dollar value of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a 
fraction of total dollar value of trades in months 6 to 18 after an acquisition is announced. The main 
independent variable in Panel A is the target investor dummy that takes the value of one if the investor 
holds the target stock a year before the acquisition announcement, and that in Panel B is the target 
neighbour dummy that takes the value of one if the investor lives within 3 miles of any target investor 
and is not a target investor himself. Investor-level controls include the investor’s income, age, number 
of children, number of family member, gender, and martial status. Zip code level controls include the 
zip code population, fraction of male residents, average house value, number household members, and 
household income. We only include in our sample retail investors that have at least one trade in the 
two year window surrounding an acquisition; we further require that these investors do not trade or 
hold any stocks from the acquirer industry in the year before the acquisition. Columns (1) and (2) of 
both panels report regression results based on stock-financed M&As, which are defined as acquisitions 
that are at least partially financed by stocks; columns (3) and (4) report regression results based on 
cash-financed M&As, which are defined as acquisitions that are 100% financed by cash. Standard errors, 
shown in brackets, are clustered at zip code and time levels. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Target Investors 
 Stock-Financed M&As Cash-Financed M&As 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Investor 0.0142*** 0.0120*** 0.0013 0.0013 
 [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0033] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 6,943,336 6,943,336 3,220,313 3,220,313 
Adj. R2 1.50% 1.44% 2.35% 2.24% 
     
Panel B: Target Neighbours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Neighbour 0.0014** 0.0015** -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 6,941,105 6,941,105 3,219,641 3,219,641 
Adj. R2 1.50% 1.45% 2.35% 2.24% 
 
 
  
 
 
Table A5. Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports regressions of investors trading in the acquirer industry on the target investor and 
target neighbour dummies. The dependent variable in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) in both Panels A, 
B and C is the number of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding the acquirer firm) as a fraction of 
total number of trades across all industries in months 6 to 18 after an acquisition is announced, and 
that in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) is the dollar value of trades in the acquirer industry (excluding 
the acquirer firm) as a fraction of total dollar value of trades in months 6 to 18 after an acquisition is 
announced. The main independent variable in columns (1)-(4) in both panels is the target investor 
dummy that takes the value of one if the investor holds the target stock at the end of the month before 
the acquisition announcement, and that in columns (5)-(8) is the target neighbour dummy that takes 
the value of one if the investor lives within 3 miles of any target investor and is not a target investor 
himself. Investor-level controls include the investor’s income, age, number of children, number of family 
member, gender, and martial status. Zip code level controls include the zip code population, fraction of 
male residents, average house value, number household members, and household income. We only 
include in our sample retail investors that have at least one trade in the two year window surrounding 
an acquisition; we further require that these investors do not trade or hold any stocks from the acquirer 
industry in the year before the acquisition. In Panel A, we exclude investors that are also holding other 
target stocks in the sample period. In Panel B, we exclude investors that are within 100 miles of either 
the acquirer or target firms.  I  Panel C, we only consider the investors who hold stocks within the 
targets’ industries before the M&A events or trade at least once within one year before the M&A events. 
Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) report regression results based on stock-financed M&As, which are defined 
as acquisitions that are at least partially financed by stocks; columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) report 
regression results based on cash-financed M&As, which are defined as acquisitions that are 100% 
financed by cash. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at zip code and time levels. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Exclude Investors Holding Other Target Stocks in the Sample Period 
 Target Investors Target Neighbours 
 Stock M&As Cash M&As Stock M&As Cash M&As 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Target 0.0230*** 0.0204*** 0.0045 0.0061 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0001 0.0000 
 [0.0048] [0.0047] [0.0035] [0.0041] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0010] [0.0010] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 7,576,448 7,576,448 3,479,807 3,479,807 7,574,164 7,574,164 3,479,091 3,479,091
Adj. R2 1.66% 1.60% 2.37% 2.25% 1.66% 1.60% 2.36% 2.25% 
         
Panel B: Exclude Investors within 100 Miles of Either the Acquirer or Target 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Target 0.0238*** 0.0212*** 0.0042 0.0060 0.0017** 0.0015** 0.0003 0.0002 
 [0.0049] [0.0048] [0.0036] [0.0041] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0011] [0.0011] 
Investor Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Zip Code Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Event-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 7,497,533 7,497,533 3,449,347 3,449,347 7,495,339 7,495,339 3,448,646 3,448,646
Adj. R2 1.65% 1.59% 2.38% 2.27% 1.65% 1.59% 2.38% 2.27% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1 U.S Heat map of communication speed (Trading Frequency) 
This figure shows the U.S heat map  of state-level the communication speed calculated from the 
regression in the Table 5. The dependent variable is the number of trades in the acquirer industry as a 
fraction of total number of trades across all industries. In addition to the control variable in Column 
(1) of Table 5, we allow the coefficients of Avg(Tradej)  to differ across states. Then we define t-stats 
of Avg(Tradej)  as the communication speed for each state. The correlation between the communication 
speed and the social index in Figure 1 is 0.45 with p-value below 0.01.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2 U.S Heat map of communication speed (Dollar-based Trading Frequency) 
This figure shows the U.S heat map of state-level the communication speed calculated from the 
regression in the Table 5. The dependent variable is the dollar value of trades in the acquirer industry 
as a fraction of total dollar value of trades across all industries. In addition to the control variable in 
Column (1) of Table 5, we allow the coefficients of Avg(Tradej)  to differ across states. Then we define 
t-stats of Avg(Tradej)  as the communication speed for each state. The correlation between the 
communication speed and the social index in Figure 1 is 0.49 with p-value below 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
